Monthly Archives: June 2016

SIRTE

SIRTE

Il recente attacco alle porte di Sirte in Libia conclusosi per ora con una parziale vittoria di Al Sarraj ha visto nella realtà scendere in campo a fianco dei soldati libici, numerosi commandos  di truppe speciali europee.

Nel dettaglio sono intervenuti reparti di Elite militari francesi, inglesi, americani ed italiani.

Le operazioni sono considerate di “Intelligence Attivo “ e gestite con la massima riservatezza e coperte dal segreto di Stato dai vari paesi coinvolti.

Nel caso di specie attendibili fonti locali indicano che le forze speciali francesi da tempo schierate in Libia sotto copertura nell’Area di Tobruk sono intervenute nella battaglia di Sirte con uccisione mirate e chirurgiche al fine di tagliare la linea logistica di rifornimento dello Stato Islamico.

Sono stati usati dai francesi appositi sistemi d’armi molto sofisticati con mortai trasportabili a puntamento telematico con designatore sul terreno; le azioni sono tutte andate a buon fine isolando sul lato orientale di Sirte gli uomini del Califfato.

La stampa internazionale non parla dell’intervento francese per chiari motivi di riservatezza, ma il lavoro più incisivo in questa fase  è chiaro che è stato fatto dai francesi che hanno ridotto al minimo la capacità di fuoco degli uomini del califfato.

L’intelligence americana ha fini ad ora operato con caccia da ricognizione e nella fase successiva ed operativa una volta acquisite le giuste informAzioni con Droni a pilotaggio remoto.

Predator armati  con missili a guida laser AGM – 114RS HELLFIRE II di fabbricazione statunitense.

Il pilotaggio remoto americano è gestito direttamente dalla CIA  le operation rooms sono basate nel vecchio aeroporto militare  di Sigonella in Sicilia Italia, in un’area apparentemente dismessa ma ancora utilizzata in forma anonima dall’intelligence americana come location per la logistica delle operazioni in Nord Africa.

Sul territorio libico gli Special Forces americani ed italiani sono invece insediati nell’area compresa tra Harawa, Nufaliya, Bin Jawade  ed Ajdabiya a metà strada tra Bengasi e Tripoli verso i campi petroliferi.

Gli uomini Usa e italiani vestono abiti borghesi tanto da confondersi con disinvoltura con una delle tante milizie  libiche che operano nella zona.

Sono equipaggiati con fucili d’assalto  Colt M4 perfetti per l’elitrasporto e Colt M16, per le armi da fianco utilizzano prevalentemente pistole semiautomatiche Glock 19 e 17 cal. 9×21 e cal.40 di fabbricazione austriaca.

I fucili sono predisposti anche al lancio di granate con sistema di puntamento laser.

Gli americani provengono dai Rangers dei Marines e dai Navy  Seals e sono scelti per le loro caratteristiche particolarmente adatte alla guerriglia urbana dove preparazione fisica e tecnica sono fondamentali.

Gli Italiani invece provengono dagli alpini paracadutisti, dal reparto Col Moschin e dagli incursori della Marina Militare COMSUBIN – GOI  e sono inquadrati nell’organico del TF 45 unità militare segreta che opera da anni nelle missioni cosiddette fantasma, utilizzano gli stessi armamenti individuali degli americani.

Il TF 45 nella riconquista di Sirte stà operando prevalentemente nella preparazione degli scontri urbani e nel controllo dell’area portuale.

L’intelligence inglese stà invece utilizzando gli uomini della S.A.S.  e della S.O.C.  con incursioni aeree e bombardamenti mirati. Sul terreno utilizza unità di bonifica quartieri che sono penetrate nella periferia di Sirte, grazie anche all’utilizzo di esperti Snipers equipaggiati con fucili di precisione M200 ONEY TAC e BARRET M 95 calibro 50 (12.7 mm).

 

© RIPRODUZIONE RISERVATA

SIRTE

SIRTE

Il recente attacco alle porte di Sirte in Libia conclusosi per ora con una parziale vittoria di Al Sarraj ha visto nella realtà scendere in campo a fianco dei soldati libici, numerosi commandos  di truppe speciali europee.

Nel dettaglio sono intervenuti reparti di Elite militari francesi, inglesi, americani ed italiani.

Le operazioni sono considerate di “Intelligence Attivo “ e gestite con la massima riservatezza e coperte dal segreto di Stato dai vari paesi coinvolti.

Nel caso di specie attendibili fonti locali indicano che le forze speciali francesi da tempo schierate in Libia sotto copertura nell’Area di Tobruk sono intervenute nella battaglia di Sirte con uccisione mirate e chirurgiche al fine di tagliare la linea logistica di rifornimento dello Stato Islamico.

Sono stati usati dai francesi appositi sistemi d’armi molto sofisticati con mortai trasportabili a puntamento telematico con designatore sul terreno; le azioni sono tutte andate a buon fine isolando sul lato orientale di Sirte gli uomini del Califfato.

La stampa internazionale non parla dell’intervento francese per chiari motivi di riservatezza, ma il lavoro più incisivo in questa fase  è chiaro che è stato fatto dai francesi che hanno ridotto al minimo la capacità di fuoco degli uomini del califfato.

L’intelligence americana ha fini ad ora operato con caccia da ricognizione e nella fase successiva ed operativa una volta acquisite le giuste informAzioni con Droni a pilotaggio remoto.

Predator armati  con missili a guida laser AGM – 114RS HELLFIRE II di fabbricazione statunitense.

Il pilotaggio remoto americano è gestito direttamente dalla CIA  le operation rooms sono basate nel vecchio aeroporto militare  di Sigonella in Sicilia Italia, in un’area apparentemente dismessa ma ancora utilizzata in forma anonima dall’intelligence americana come location per la logistica delle operazioni in Nord Africa.

Sul territorio libico gli Special Forces americani ed italiani sono invece insediati nell’area compresa tra Harawa, Nufaliya, Bin Jawade  ed Ajdabiya a metà strada tra Bengasi e Tripoli verso i campi petroliferi.

Gli uomini Usa e italiani vestono abiti borghesi tanto da confondersi con disinvoltura con una delle tante milizie  libiche che operano nella zona.

Sono equipaggiati con fucili d’assalto  Colt M4 perfetti per l’elitrasporto e Colt M16, per le armi da fianco utilizzano prevalentemente pistole semiautomatiche Glock 19 e 17 cal. 9×21 e cal.40 di fabbricazione austriaca.

I fucili sono predisposti anche al lancio di granate con sistema di puntamento laser.

Gli americani provengono dai Rangers dei Marines e dai Navy  Seals e sono scelti per le loro caratteristiche particolarmente adatte alla guerriglia urbana dove preparazione fisica e tecnica sono fondamentali.

Gli Italiani invece provengono dagli alpini paracadutisti, dal reparto Col Moschin e dagli incursori della Marina Militare COMSUBIN – GOI  e sono inquadrati nell’organico del TF 45 unità militare segreta che opera da anni nelle missioni cosiddette fantasma, utilizzano gli stessi armamenti individuali degli americani.

Il TF 45 nella riconquista di Sirte stà operando prevalentemente nella preparazione degli scontri urbani e nel controllo dell’area portuale.

L’intelligence inglese stà invece utilizzando gli uomini della S.A.S.  e della S.O.C.  con incursioni aeree e bombardamenti mirati. Sul terreno utilizza unità di bonifica quartieri che sono penetrate nella periferia di Sirte, grazie anche all’utilizzo di esperti Snipers equipaggiati con fucili di precisione M200 ONEY TAC e BARRET M 95 calibro 50 (12.7 mm).

 

© RIPRODUZIONE RISERVATA

Jordan’s open confrontation with terrorism

After the terrorist attack on the Jordanian access point for the Syrian refugees “Ruqban”, Jordan has found itself in an open and unstoppable confrontation with terrorist groups. Therefore, it might be logical that any forthcoming confrontation would take a bigger dimension, especially that this act might be the reverberation of the operation through which ISIS from Iraq and Syria will be eliminated. Such risky procedure might push the terrorist groups and their allies to breach new border areas and have a wider space for conflict, and thus secure some new shelters to escape the attacks on its territories.

Many security experts believe that various terrorist groups seek to adopt new strategies based on surprising attacks in different and new places. These kinds of outbreaks are expected to coincide with the intensification of attacks against ISIS in Mosul and Raqa. This ISIS strategy can be used also to distract the international coalition from ISIS preparation to move to plan “B” which includes targeting various new places by directing shocking and terrifying operations.

In return to the Jordanian issue, the direct attack on the Jordanian military access point means that Jordan is now in the range of the direct outbreaks, therefore; Jordan should muddle through such transformation by implementing a radical change in the way Jordan is dealing with the Syrian and Iraqi crisis, on both levels regionally and internationally.

The declaration of this open war would also mean that these attacks might not be limited just on military and security targets; actually it might also target the civic life.

A clear strategic vision and scientific planning should face the near-term phase of confrontation with terrorism. The coming challenges require a very high level of professionalism, and well consideration of the current risks generating from the changes in the terrorists’ mentalities and the nature of terrorist attacks. Such challenges, as well, require a strong high state of commitment and seriousness so Jordan can maintain security: “strong control, attentive follow-up, prompt intervention”. This should go parallel to an enhancing process with the official public discourse that aims to make this public discourse the only credible source of information. Moreover, it is important to focus on building a smart moral mobilization process far from demagoguery that usually gives negative impacts and shows the lack of professionalism and credibility.

In conclusion, the “Ruqban” terrorist attack might be more complex than it appears, specifically, that the terrorists have succeeded in this operation while previously the security services in Jordan have managed to undermine and deal with hundreds of previous attempts without even declaring it.  However, any security mistake should be addressed scientifically, and should push the authorities to work more on preventing any coming attempt by operating hypothetical scenarios to study the terrorists’ new mentalities, behavior and attitude.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

الاردن ما بعد عملية "الرقبان" : تحديات بداية المواجهة المفتوحة

مع الاعتداء الارهابي على النقطة الامنية العسكرية الاردنية في معبر “الرقبان”على الحدود الاردنية السورية، يكون الاردن قد دخل بصور مباشرة في دائرة المواجهة المفتوحة مع التنظيمات الارهابية. لهذا قد يكون من الطبيعي ان تأخذ المواجهة القادمة بعداً اكبر نظراً للتداعيات الطبيعية لعمليات اجتثاث التنظيم الرئيسي في المنطقة “داعش” من سوريا و العراق، الامر الذي قد يدفع التنظيم و حلفاءه نحو السعي المباشر لاحداث  خرق في مناطق حدودية جديدة يتم عبرها توسيع رقعة المواجهة من جهة, و من جهة أخرى تشكل ملجأً للهروب من الضربات المباشرة في مناطق التنظيم الرئيسية.

من زاوية أخرى، تسعى التنظيمات الارهابية الى انتهاج استراتيجية الضربات المفاجئة في مناطق متعددة و جديدة و هو امر يتوقع ان يتزامن مع اشتداد الضربات على التنظيم في الرقة و الموصل و اقتراب انحسار تواجد داعش في هذه المناطق. الهدف من هذه العمليات قد يكون ايضاً تشتيت انتباه التحالف الدولي عن ترتيبات أخرى يقوم بها التنظيم للانتقال الى “الخطة ب” و التي تتضمن الانتقال الي اماكن جديدة تواكبها عملية استخدام لعاملي “الصدمة و الرعب” في اماكن متعددة و متباعدة.

بالعودة الى الاردن، ان الهجوم المباشر الذي تعرض له افراد المؤسسة الامنية و العسكرية الاردنية يعني باختصار ان الاردن اصبح في مرمى المواجهة المباشرة و التي لا بد من التكييف معها اردنيا عبر احداث تغيير جذري في شكل التعاطي مع الازمة السورية و العراقية سياسياً و أمنياً، على الصعيدين الدولي و الاقليمي.

اعلان الحرب المفتوحة يعني ان الامور لم و لن تقتصر على فكرة الاستهداف الحدودي بل قد تنتقل ايضاً الى تبنى تكتيكات استهداف الحياة المدنية و تفاصيلها، خصوصاً ان العمليات التي استهدفت الاردن الى اليوم هي عمليات استهدفت في جوهرها اماكن و افراد المؤسسة الامنية و العسكرية.

المرحلة القادمة في المواجهة هي مرحلة لا يمكن الركون بها الى عوامل تفتفقد لرؤية الاستراتيجية الواضحة و التخطيط العلمي السليم. فالتحديات القادمة بحاجة الى مهنية عالية و استيعاب شكل الاخطار القادمة و التحولات في شكل العمل الارهابي و طبيعته،  مما يتطلب حالة عالية من الالتزام و جدية كبيرة في التعاطي مع عملية حفظ الامن “سيطرة، متابعة، تدخل سريع”.  تتزامن هذه العملية مع ضرورة تقديم خطاب اعلامي ذكي يستطيع ان يجعل من نفسه مصدراً أساسياً  للمعلومة و يتمتع بمصداقية تؤهله ان يكون قناة الخطاب الوحيد و الرسمي للمجتمع، و يستطيع ان يقوم بعملية تعبئة معنوية حقيقية بعيداً عن الغوغائية و التخبط الذي عادةً ما تكون نتائجه عكسية و يكون سبباً أساسياً للنفور و مثالاً لغياب المهنية و المصداقية و الاستخفاف بالعقول.

باختصار بعيداً عن تفاصيل عملية”الرقبان” الارهابية التي تبدو حيثياتها أكثر تعقيداً من اي محاولة سابقة استطاعت الاجهزة الامنية ابطالها و التعامل معها حتى دون اعلان، لكنها تمثل للاسف نموذجاً للخرق الامني الذي لابد ان يتم معالجته و معالجة اي احتمالية لهجمات أخرى وهذا ممكن ان يتم ايضاً عبر تطبيق سيناريوهات افتراضية مبنية على دراسات لشكل التحول الارهابي و العقليات الجديدة التي تتسيد التنظيمات الارهابية الرئيسية  و تفريخاتها المتعددة.

د.عامر السبايلة

How to face the new waves of terrorism

Everyday the new tactics of ISIS prove to work efficiently in achieving two major goals, first to be able to conduct terrorist attacks, second to put more pressure on security system of many countries.

Since the declaration of the Caliphate By ISIS the security challenges took new dimension, it has become an open global confrontation. However, the most important issue about this is the radical change in the style and the way by which the operations are being conducted.

During the long anti terror war, security systems have to deal with high tech sophisticated operations, or to fight organized groups etc. Today’s challenges have completely changed; it is not anymore the sophisticated operation, it transfers to a very simple form like attacking stabbing, shooting etc, which make it very difficult for security systems to deal with it. Moreover, it is not anymore the big centralized group that security systems can infiltrate; it becomes an unknown person, usually without any criminal tracks. Such person doesn’t communicate with any group, so from security point of view it’s a timing bomb that nobody can know when or where it will blow up.

This new development is considered a radical change that managed to put the security system and its personnel under real pressure.  Especially, on which are the plans and strategies that can be immediately adopted to face such new risks.

The multi dimensional challenges should push all security systems to work more on capacity building program for all its personnel, by focusing on enhancing the level of professionalism. Comprehensive understanding of the new style of terrorism and the high level of risks that generate from simple mistakes that security person can do should guarantee the flow of such procedure.

On the other side, the new style of terrorism that target all aspects of civic life can be really harmful for it can leave high number of victims and casualties as if it was a very complex, a well-planned terrorist attack. It is really challenging to prevent attacks like shooting on crowds, or stabbing or even assaults on police, military or security stations or even public places. Therefore, it is important to start thinking about new effective ways to face such danger. Citizens should be involved in facing the new style of terrorism; this requires also a raising awareness process to make ordinary citizens understand the level of risks and act with great sense of responsibility. The state should develop a professional portal to receive comments, observations and remarks from people regarding any suspected issue they might observe. Any piece of information might be critical today to save the country and protect its people from any terrorist attack that might happen. At the same time, the security system needs to work more on enhancing the rule of law in all aspects, closing an eye on some outlaw behavior, due to changing in priorities and the new merging between terrorist and criminal groups, would lead to serious problems. Therefore, the state should make sure to present everywhere and act immediately against any breaking of law, street violation, drugs, weapons, corruption, and bullying, all people should be under the law. By doing this, the state can at least guarantee a positive atmosphere that can   help in facing the challenges coming from the new style of terrorism.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

Jordan in the eyes of US Counterterrorism reports

The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism of the US department has recently published its country reports on terrorism 2015.

Focusing on Jordan, the reports insist that Jordan has remained a key U.S. ally in countering terrorism and violent extremist ideology in 2015. Taking into consideration that Jordan has lately become vulnerable to various threats due to its core location in a tumultuous region.

However, the report addresses how Jordan worked to prevent flows of foreign terrorist fighters headed to Syria and Iraq, and how it restricted terrorism financing. The role of Jordan in weakening and confronting the violent ideology was clearly mentioned, King Abdullah’s II efforts, Government, NGOs etc. As a matter of fact, many positive points can be seen in the report, hence; some other points need to be tackled seriously.

The report has highly appreciated the role that Jordanian security systems (GID, JRF, PSD) cooperate and coordinate their work especially regarding issues like border’s security and investigation over non-terrorism law. Nevertheless, the report also indicates that:

“Jordan’s security and intelligence services do not coordinate with one another in all situations, including in terrorism incident response.”

 Although, the report doesn’t mention specific cases or the level of this lack of cooperation, this is a point to be considered seriously in any coming revision for security work, and all this due to the increasing challenges and threats coming from the new waves of “non sophisticated terrorism” where any information might be valuable and important to save the country from any brutal incident. On the other hand, this is also a common problem that many countries recently face due to the interconnection of cases that lead to kind of overlapping of powers. For example, many security reports are addressing recently the level of cooperation of many criminal organizations and ISIS. This is one of the examples that show how the different mandates of security systems are meeting.

Another point to address is the issue of Jordan’s anti-extremist strategy, announced in fall 2014. The report says that the strategy “remained under-resourced and unstaffed, however, and Jordan’s leaders are reticent to acknowledge domestic radicalization, including self-radicalization.” 

It is really astonishing to discover that such important strategy was delivered to US department of the state without publishing it in Jordan, or even talking about it to the internal promoters of such ideology (local experts and media). At the same time, it is obvious that this strategy is still a theoretical effort that couldn’t unfortunately be implemented in the de radicalization battle where every single day lost is becoming important. Moreover, the report indicates that Jordan continued its efforts to expand its de radicalization process in schools and mosques, but: “these efforts were rarely well-coordinated across government agencies.”

Today, Jordan needs to work more on enhancing the coordination among its political and security institution, but at the same time, it needs a courageous position in pointing the sources of radicalization. This new counter radicalization strategy can never be implemented by a classical mode, or with old way of thinking. It needs new faces who know exactly how to diagnoses the problem and know how to interfere according to a mid- term strategy. Working on this strategy should be far from what the Jordanian political system suffers from, nepotism, cronyism, and favoritism. Therefore, this strategy needs a new spirit that can really transform theories to actions.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

قراءة امنية سياسية للاحداث الاخيرة في الاردن

مع وصول المواجهة مع التنظيمات الارهابية الى نقطة المواجهة المفتوحة، يجد الاردن نفسه مضطراً لاعادة قراءة الواقع الداخلي بطريقة اكثر عملية و علمية. تتزامن العملية الارهابية التي استهدفت مكتب المخابرات العامة في مخيم البقعة مع تصاعد المواجهة مع تنظيم داعش في سوريا و العراق مع اقتراب وصول الجيش السوري الى الرقة و العراقي الى الموصول، مما يعني ان اي قراءة معمقة  للبعد الاقليمي للمشهد الارهابي تعني ان التنظيمات الارهابية ستسعى منطقياً لتعويض خسائرها في معاقلها عبر احداث عمليات ارهابية في مناطق جديدة يكون الاردن احد اقوى المرشحين لمثل هذه المواجهة.

الاردن في بوابة المواجهة المستمرة مع هذه التنظيمات و لا يمكن اسقاط ان التحديات الامنية تتزايد و تتنوع في اشكالها، من انهاك الاجهزة الامنية التي تعمل على مدار الساعة الى تطور الارهاب و شكله و اساليبه بطريقة تضع ايضاً مهنية الاجهزة امام اختبارات حقيقية، لكن بغض النظر عن المشهد العام للمواجهة مع الارهاب لابد من قراءة حادثة البقعة من زوايا جديدة، أهمها:    

اولاً ان وصول التنظيمات الارهابية لنقطة المواجهة في الداخل الاردني هو امر متوقع نظراً للتنامي المرعب لهذه التنظيمات و التي تتوفر لها حواضن داخلية منعددة لم يتم التعامل معها -الى الان – بطريقة عمليه علمية بل باسلوب غض لابصر، او تطبيق فكرة استخدام ادوات متطرفة في جوهرها لمواجهة التطرف الذي يأخذ شكل الخلايا السرطانية. من الملفت أيضاً ان تقرير الامن القومي الامريكي للاعام ٢٠١٥ حول مكافحة الارهاب و التطرف الصادر مؤخراً  يشير بوضوح الى فشل سياسة مكافحة التطرف الاردنية و القائمين عليها في احداث اي تغيير ملموس في كيفة التعاطي مع التنظيمات الارهابية و المتطرفة بعيداً عن الخيار الامني.

ثانياً، ان التغيير الجذري في شكل و الية الارهاب و سقوط نظرية العمليات المعقدة في مقابل نمو متزايد للعمليات غير المعقدة التي يستطيع فرد واحد ان يقوم بعمل ارهابي كبير، مثل اليات التفجير الفردي، اطلاق الرصاص المباشر، او وضع القنابل المصنعة يدوياً،  يعني ان المواجهة القادمة مع الارهاب هي مواجهة مفتوحة و خطيرة يمكن ان تحدث في اي مكان و زمان، و بالتالي فان التعاطي المستقبلي مع الاخطار لابد ان يأخذ بعين الاعتبار ان تجفيف منابع الارهاب اصبح امراً واجباً و ليسترفاً يتم تأجيلهب حجة ان الاولوية هي لمواجهة الوضع الامني الحالي، فالوضع الامني الحالي اصبح جزء من من ضرورة البدء في مكافحة التطرف جدياً.     

اما اختيار ان يكون الهدف هو مكتب المخابرات في مخيم البقعة للاجئين فهو يحظى برمزية كبيرة و محاولة لربط مخيمات اللاجئين في الاردن في ما يجري في مخيمات اللاجئين في الدول المضيفة ، كما جرى في مخيم اليرموك في دمشق او عين الحلوة و نهر البارد في لبنان. واي قراءة امنية تشير الىسهولة تنفيذ مثل هذه العمليات غير المعقدة(اطلاق رصاص من سلاح اتوماتيكي)  و احداث ضرر كبير و توجية ضربة معنوية كبيرة للدولة الاردنية و سهولة خروج المنفذين و دخولهم الى تجمعات سكانية كثيفة مما يؤدي الى تطورات لا يحمد عقباها..

 المرحلة الحالية تتطلب جرأة و تغيير في سياسة ادارة الملفات الداخلية، و تتطلب رؤية حقيقية بعيداً عن حالة الانكار السائدة . نسب التطرف في الاردن هي من اعلى النسب الموجودة، و انواع التطرف و شكله يجب التعامل معه بأسلوب حاسم ضمن استراتيجية واقعية يتم تطبيقها بأسلوب مهني و عملي دون خوف او تردد.

د.عامر السبايلة

Addressing the causes, not the symptoms

The preparations for the battle of Raqa and Mosul, the base of ISIS, seem to continue. The US seems even to look for an exclusive victory over ISIS, an important goal that Obama’s administration has achieved before the end of its term.

The major pending questions in the area are: Does eliminating ISIS mean the end of the organization or terrorism? Is the world interested in eliminating ISIS or eliminating the continuous breeding of terrorist groups?

Most of the information shows that the coming battle with Daesh would be able to destroy the structure of the terrorist organization. However, it might lead to a very critical stage in any coming confrontation with any new terrorist organization such as “Daesh 2”.

In the confrontation with such terrorist groups, it is important to analyze carefully the issue of declaration of the caliphate by ISIS. Also, it will bring any coming confrontation to a dead end even if ISIS disappears and other new organizations appear. In a matter of fact, if any new terrorist group is born, then it will find itself as a successor of the declared caliphate, therefore; the dimension of security challenges in case of ISIS or any coming group will be always global and the threats will target all the details of civic life. Moreover, the evolution of this terrorist doctrine shows that the more groups breed, the level of violence and brutality tends to increase, which simply means that any coming group will be more brutal and violent than ISIS itself.

  The declaration of the Caliphate from ISIS side was kind of the declaration of the battle of “Armageddon”, the final battle that lives in the mind of many people from the battle of “Al Sham” and “Dabiq” to the invasion of Constantinople and Rome. Thus, the strategy of declaring the Caliphate managed to transform many persons to serve ISIS.

Remote extremists and Salafists, those who suffer form social, economic, political, and psychological problems all turned to be a timing bomb that is ready to explode anytime and any where in the context of the final battle and the victory of the Caliphate. In addition to that, the strategy of declaring the caliphate has opened a door for the “pilgrimage toward the terrorist group “this gesture has also put all the political systems that insist to build its identity on religious legitimacy in a kind of existential crisis, from the prospective of who represents Islam or the Sunni world. All this made the battle of some political systems with ISIS a battle on who owns the past and who is allowed to represent it in the present.

The battle today should be a progressive battle for change and a cultural battle for values. Meanwhile, insisting on making use of this battle politically would mean that there will be no solutions to face the source and reasons behind the continuous breeding of these extremist and terrorist groups. This would simply mean that the coming phase would witness a new conflict with very advanced brutal groups that will be viewed as an upgraded version of Daesh, called Daesh 2.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh