From Open War to Deferred War

14/6/2026

Last week witnessed a brief return to military escalation, a clear indication that the factors that pushed the region into open confrontation remain intact and that the conflict itself has yet to reach its true endpoint.

For the three principal actors, the latest developments revealed much about the nature of the current phase. From the Israeli perspective, the strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs was largely symbolic. Rather than a deep military operation or a campaign of widespread destruction, it appeared to be a calculated attempt to provoke an Iranian response and break the existing stalemate. Such a move was hardly unexpected. Iran cannot remain indefinitely under a pressure campaign that began with war and continued through sanctions and isolation. From this perspective, breaking the deadlock also serves an Iranian interest.

At the same time, Israel remains committed to separating the Lebanese front from any future agreement with Tehran while maintaining pressure on Hezbollah. Equally significant was the demonstration that direct action against Iran remains firmly embedded within Israeli strategic calculations, even during periods of negotiation. The message was clear: negotiations do not necessarily create immunity from military pressure.

For Tehran, renewed strikes against Israel carry political significance beyond their military value. Entering negotiations under the image of submission to American pressure is not a position the Iranian leadership is prepared to accept. Limited military action therefore becomes a means of restoring an image of strength, preserving deterrence, and demonstrating continued regional relevance in the face of growing perceptions that Iran is gradually losing some of the instruments through which it projected influence across the region.

The United States, meanwhile, appears increasingly convinced of the effectiveness of sustained pressure without crossing the threshold into large-scale war. Recent American strikes conveyed a broader message: pressure intended to bring Iran to the negotiating table can, if necessary, be transformed into military pressure designed to shape the terms of an agreement.

At the same time, the fronts upon which Iran once relied to transfer the crisis into Israel or generate wider regional instability are gradually being contained. Missiles and drones launched from Yemen no longer constitute a strategic balance of power, while prolonged disruption of maritime routes only increases international determination to restore stability and secure critical waterways.

The underlying objective of the latest escalation appears to be pushing Iran toward an agreement without prolonged negotiations. Yet the regional landscape reveals realities that cannot be ignored. The process of separating conflict arenas is advancing steadily. In Iraq, some armed factions have begun moving toward arrangements under state authority, marking the beginning of what could become a long process aimed at ending the concept of a state within a state.

Lebanon, meanwhile, is moving along two parallel tracks. The first is political, under American sponsorship, based on the assumption that negotiations can become the gateway to a fundamental restructuring of the Lebanese landscape. The second is military, focused on sustaining pressure on Hezbollah, reducing its capabilities, and limiting its freedom of action. Notably, both tracks continue to advance simultaneously without obstructing one another.

The most important dimension, however, is the effort to redirect Iran’s attention inward as it confronts the realities of the post-war period. Economic considerations have become decisive, making sanctions relief and access to frozen assets critical components of any future settlement. At the same time, Washington appears determined to retain significant influence over Iran’s future priorities and strategic behavior.

Israeli calculations remain equally important. For Israel, coexistence with the Iranian threat has become increasingly unacceptable. Yet weakening the Iranian regime is no longer necessarily the ultimate objective after years of costly regional confrontations. As a result, any agreement with Iran is unlikely to bring a definitive end to the conflict.

The more likely scenario is a transition from open war to deferred war—from direct military confrontation to the management of conflict. In such an environment, American and Israeli military and intelligence superiority will remain the primary instruments for preserving and adjusting the new regional order now taking shape.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh